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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
A jury convicted Mario Reyes of domestic battery with traumatic injury, attempted
strangulation, and aggravated assault of his wife, after the district court made various erroneous
rulings which allowed the State to paint Mr. Reyes as a bad person, a wife-batterer, a repeat
offender, and someone who is feared by those who know him. Because the district court's errors
surely contributed to the verdicts and deprived Mr. Reyes of a fair trial, this Court should vacate
his judgment of conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
On July 16, 2017, Mr. Reyes went out for drinks with his wife, his wife's niece, Ms. Neri,
and Ms. Neri's husband. (Tr., p.212, L.23-p.214, L.18, p.267, L.20-p.268, L.10.) The group
went back to the Reyes house for drinks on the patio sometime after midnight. (Tr., p.214, L.19p.215, L.15, p.230, Ls.8-12, p.268, Ls.9-19.) After everyone had gone to bed, the Reyeses got
in a physical altercation and officers were dispatched to the home. (Tr., p.153, L.20-p.158,
L.13) When the officers got there, Mr. Reyes and Mr. Neri were outside, Ms. Reyes was on the
kitchen floor bleeding, and Ms. Neri was trying to help Ms. Reyes. (Tr., p.169, L.4-p.173, L.14,
p.244, L.18-p.250, L.12, p.380, Ls.7-20; State's Ex. 2.) Officers arrested Mr. Reyes (see State's
Ex. 77 at 7:00-7:15), and the State later charged him with domestic battery with traumatic injury,
attempted strangulation, aggravated battery, and malicious injury to property (R., pp.19-21, 4143). Mr. Reyes maintained his innocence and took the case to trial.
At trial, the State called the Neris, various officers, the doctor and dentist that treated
Ms. Reyes, and experts on domestic violence and strangulation. (See generally Tr.) The Neris
testified that the Reyeses weren't getting along while the two couples had drinks on the patio, so
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Mr. Reyes told Ms. Reyes they should go to bed and grabbed her wrist to try to take her to bed.
(Tr., p.215, L.16-p.216, L.6, p.268, L.14-p.270, L.22.)

After the Reyeses went to their

bedroom, the Neris went to sleep on the couch. (Tr., p.217, Ls.3-16, p.270, L.23-p.271, L.3.)
They heard yelling and fighting coming from the Reyeses bedroom a short time later, and opened
the bedroom door to see Mr. Reyes holding Ms. Reyes up against the wall by the neck.
(Tr., p.217, L.l 7-p.218, L.20, p.231, Ls.10-13, p.271, L.4-p.272, L.8.) Ms. Neri said Mr. Reyes
was holding a clothes iron in his other hand. (Tr., p.218, Ls.23-24.) After Mr. Reyes let go of
Ms. Reyes, the Reyeses were hitting and throwing things at each other. (Tr., p.219, L.9-p.221,
L.5, p.272, L.9-p.273, L.10.) Ms. Reyes was crying, but no one was bleeding. (Tr., p.231,
L.14-p.323, L.25.) At some point during the altercation, Ms. Neri called 911 but hung up.
(Tr., p.224, L.16-p.225, L.5; State's Ex. 1.) During Ms. Neri's testimony, the court overruled
defense counsel's relevance objection and allowed Ms. Neri to testify that she had asked the
police to tell the defendant that the neighbors had called the police, rather than Ms. Neri, because
then Ms. Reyes wouldn't talk to her. (Tr., p.226, L.13-p.228 L.5.)
The Neris broke up the fight and everyone started walking out of the bedroom.
(Tr., p.221, L.6-p.222, L.4, p.273, Ls.10-13.) Then Mr. Reyes pulled Ms. Reyes's hair, she fell
to the ground, and he kicked her in the face. (Tr., p.222, Ls.5-18, p.273, L.14-p.274, L.21.)
After that, Mr. Reyes told everyone to leave, and as Mr. Reyes and Mr. Neri walked toward the
door, officers got there. (Tr., p.222, L.19-p.224, L.14, p.276, Ls.1-17; but see State's Ex. 2 at
00:30-1 :00 (video from Officer Ivie's body camera showing that Mr. Reyes and Mr. Neri came
outside of the house before Officer Ivie contacted them).) Ms. Neri stayed with Ms. Reyes, who
was face down bleeding and wasn't moving. (Tr., p.222, L.19-p.223, L.19.)

2

In the middle of its case-in-chief on the second day of trial, the State explained that it was
unable to serve Ms. Reyes a subpoena for the correct trial dates, so it sought to declare
Ms. Reyes unavailable and read her preliminary hearing testimony to the jury per Idaho Rule of
Evidence 804(a)(5). (Tr., p.342, L.18-p.343, L.4, p.345, L.5-p.360, L.1.) The district court
found Ms. Reyes unavailable, even though the State had successfully served Ms. Reyes with the
alternate trial dates, the State would not finish its case in chief until the next day, Ms. Reyes was
under defense counsel's subpoena for the next day, and defense counsel assured the court that
Ms. Reyes intended to appear to testify, because the court did not believe "the State should be
required to bear the risk of whether or not Ms. Reyes decides to appear tomorrow." (Tr., p.363,
L.23-p.365, L.9 (emphasis added); see also Tr., p.344, Ls.2-21, p.361, L.15-p.362, L.12.) The
court thus allowed the State to read Ms. Reyes' s preliminary hearing testimony to the jury, in
which she said that Mr. Reyes hit, choked, and kicked her on the night in question, and that she
broke her arm, nose, and teeth as a result. (Tr., p.372, Ls.6-15, p.374, LIO; see also Tr., p.309,
L.11-p.310, L.16 (Ms. Reyes' s dentist testifying that Ms. Reyes reported that she had been the
victim of domestic trauma and that he determined that the enamel on her front teeth had
fractured), p.330, L.2-p.333, L.15 (an emergency room doctor testifying that Ms. Reyes reported
that her husband had assaulted and strangled her, and that he had diagnosed her with a broken
nose).)
First thing the next morning, the court sua sponte appointed Ms. Reyes a public defender
because it was concerned that Ms. Reyes could be charged with perjury if she testified.
(Tr., p.497, Ls.6-p.498, L.18.) After the State called its final witness and rested, defense counsel
gave his opening argument and then called Ms. Reyes as his first witness. (Tr., p.566, L.21-
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p.570, L.16.) After speaking with her public defender, however, Ms. Reyes pled the Fifth.
(Tr., p.558, L.24-p.559, L.25, p.564, Ls.6-25, p.570, L.14-p.572, L.23.)
Mr. Reyes then took the stand. 1 According to Mr. Reyes, his wife and the Neris got
"very drunk" while out at the bar that night, and so he drove everyone back to his house.
(Tr., p.574, L.10-p.576, L.10.) He said things were "complicated" as they all sat on the back
patio, because his wife was mad at him for cheating on her. (Tr., p.576, L.22-p.577, L.15.) He
left the other three on the patio to go to bed and, as he usually does when they are fighting, he
locked the door behind him.

(Tr., p.577, L.16--p.578, L.20.)

After he had fallen asleep,

Mr. Reyes heard a noise out on the patio, then Ms. Reyes pushed the bedroom door open, threw
things at him, got on the bed, and hit him. (Tr., p.578, L.21-p.580, L.10; see also State's Ex. 77
at 3:45-9:00 (in which Mr. Reyes, as he's sitting in the back of a police car on the night of the
incident, denies doing anything to his wife and tells the officer that he went to bed and was
sleeping; his wife was drunk, came into the room, and was freaking out because she thought he
was still with another girl; and that's the way she started it), Tr., p.492, Ls.11-21 (Ms. Reyes told
officers on the scene that nothing had happened and that Mr. Reyes had not hit her), p.493, Ls.323 (the next day Ms. Reyes told officers that she couldn't remember what had happened).) After
Mr. Reyes moved his wife to the side and went to leave, the Neris came into the bedroom and
started assaulting him. (Tr., p.580, L. ll-p.581, L.8.) Mr. Reyes put on a pair of shorts, pushed
his way through, and left the house. (Tr., p.581, Ls.6-25.)
On cross-examination, the court allowed the State to question Mr. Reyes about being on
felony probation, which meant he should not have been in a bar or drinking alcohol, on the night
in question. (Tr., p.583, L.25-p.584, L.3, p.595, Ls.6-17.) The court also allowed the State to

1

Some of Mr. Reyes's testimony sounds clumsy, as he testified through an interpreter.
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question Mr. Reyes about any instances in which he did not conform to his "habit" of locking
himself in his bedroom when he and Ms. Reyes were arguing. (Tr., p.587, Ls.2-12, p.589, L.3p.590, L.11.) The prosecutor, Mr. Topmiller, went on to use a 2015 police report to question
Mr. Reyes about the details of previous charges for attempted strangulation, domestic battery,
malicious injury to property, and witness intimidation against Ms. Reyes. (Tr., p.595, L.18p.604, L.22.) Mr. Reyes answered "no" to many of the questions about the details of that alleged
incident (see e.g., Tr., p.601, Ls.22-24 ("Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: In fact, you tried to break
into the home; correct? A. No. Q. [Ms. Reyes] locked you out; correct? A. No.")), and the
district court eventually began sustaining defense counsel's objections and even sua sponte
interrupted Mr. Topmiller as his line of "questioning" devolved into a brazen attempt to tell the
jury about Mr. Reyes's prior charges (see, e.g., Tr., p.602, Ls.2-3 ("Q. Ana saw you strangle
[Ms. Reyes]; correct? THE COURT:

Will counsel approach."), p.604, Ls.11-20 (Q.

BY

MR. TOPMILLER: Is it fair to say, Mr. Reyes, that what happened in 2015 and what happened
in July of 2017 are very similar? MR. PRIOR: Judge, I'm going to object. THE COURT:
Sustained. The jury is to disregard that question. Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: And in fact, you
have the same story today that you had then? MR. PRIOR: Judge, I'm going to object. THE
COURT:

Sustained.")).

After Mr. Reyes attempted to ameliorate Mr. Topmiller's cross-

examination by testifying on redirect that all of the 2015 charges except witness intimidation had
been dismissed, Mr. Topmiller asked Mr. Reyes if his wife had been cooperative with the
prosecutor's office in the prior prosecution.

(Tr., p.607, L.9-p.608, L.11.) When the court

sustained defense counsel's objection to that question, Mr. Topmiller commented, "[w]ell,
there's a reason the charge was dropped." (Tr., p.608, Ls.12-25.)
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Mr. Reyes's neighbor, Mr. Reynolds, corroborated Mr. Reyes's account of what
happened that night. Mr. Reynolds testified that he was in his back yard smoking a cigarette on
July 16, 2017, between 2:00 and 3:00 am. (Tr., p.612, L.21-p.613, L.19.) He heard a crash and
"a table scoot on the cement," and then looked over the fence to see Ms. Reyes "on the ground
flat face." (Tr., p.613, L.23-p.614, L.11.) No one else was out there with her. (Tr., p.615,
L.16-18.) She got up, held one hand over her nose, and stumbled into the home. (Tr., p.615,
L.19-p.616, L.19.) Next, he heard banging and a woman yelling angrily. (Tr., p.616, L.25p.619, L.18.)

After ten to fifteen minutes, he saw lights from patrol cars and paramedics.

(Tr., p.619, L.17-p.620, L.22.) On cross examination, the State grilled Mr. Reynolds about its
belief that he fabricated his testimony because he and Mr. Reyes, who he hadn't previously met,
happened to see each other in the Owyhee County Jail after this incident took place. (Tr., p.622,
L.16-p.629, L.25, p.632, L.10-p.632, L.24.)

Despite the State's insistence, Mr. Reynolds

maintained that he testified truthfully. (Id.)
In its closing arguments, the other prosecutor, Ms. Morrison, falsely implied that
Ms. Reyes didn't testify because "Certainly [Ms. Reyes] is probably scared.... Why would she
want to come in and say what happened again?" (Tr., p.652, L.21-p.653, L.11.)
The jury found Mr. Reyes guilty of domestic battery with traumatic injury, attempted
strangulation, and aggravated assault 2 (R., pp.175-76), and the district court sentenced
Mr. Reyes to serve a total term of ten years, with five of those years fixed. (R., pp.224-26, 26264.) Mr. Reyes timely appealed. (R., pp.232-33.)

2

These were the three charges ultimately put to the jury, as the court granted a judgment of
acquittal on the malicious injury to property charge and the aggravated battery charge, but then
instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. (Tr., p.540, L.307, p.555,
Ls.11-14.) The judgment of conviction, however, contains a clerical error as it adjudges
Mr. Reyes guilty of aggravated battery. (R., p.224.)
6

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err and abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce
irrelevant and highly prejudicial propensity evidence regarding alleged instances in which
Mr. Reyes did not follow his "usual" practice of locking himself in his room during an
argument with his wife?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting Ms. Reyes's preliminary hearing
testimony because Ms. Reyes was available for trial and thus her preliminary hearing
testimony was inadmissible hearsay?

III.

Did the district court err by allowing the State to introduce irrelevant evidence that
Mr. Reyes was on probation at the time of these alleged crimes and thus should not have
been in a bar or drinking alcohol?

IV.

Did the district court err by admitting Ms. Neri's irrelevant testimony about how she
asked officers not to tell Mr. Reyes she had called 911?

V.

Did the district court err by allowing the prosecutor to imply in closing that Ms. Reyes
did not testify because she was scared and was reluctant to testify?

VI.

Should this Court vacate Mr. Reyes' s judgment of conviction because, even if these
errors are individually harmless, together they deprived Mr. Reyes of his Fourteenth
Amendment right to due process and a fair trial?
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ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Erred And Abused Its Discretion By Allowing The State To Introduce
Irrelevant And Highly Prejudicial Propensity Evidence Regarding Alleged Instances In Which
Mr. Reyes Did Not Follow His "Usual" Practice Of Locking Himselfln His Room During An
Argument With His Wife
Over defense counsel's objections, the court allowed the prosecutor to "impeach"
Mr. Reyes with alleged instances in which he did not follow his ''usual" practice of locking
himself in his room during arguments with his wife, which included questions about a 2015
police report charging Mr. Reyes with attempted strangulation, domestic battery, and malicious
injury to property against Ms. Reyes. That evidence was inadmissible for myriad reasons, ands
the district court erred and abused its discretion by admitting it.

Because this error surely

contributed to the verdict, this Court should vacate Mr. Reyes's judgment of conviction.

A.

Factual Background
Mr. Reyes testified on direct examination that, on the night in question, he went to his

bedroom, locked the door, and went to sleep. (Tr., p.578, Ls.9-17.) When asked why he locked
the door, he said, "when I argue with my wife, I usually close the door." (Tr., p.578, Ls.18-20
(emphasis added).)
Based on that testimony, the prosecutor asked the district court to allow it to impeach
Mr. Reyes with evidence of an earlier alleged "domestic with this victim" 3 (Tr., p.584, Ls.1722), because Mr. Reyes "claimed he followed a pattern of what he does when his wife gets

3

Mr. Reyes does not challenge the district court's decision to allow the State to impeach him
with evidence of his 2015 conviction for intimidating a witness, which arose out of the same
alleged conduct discussed in the 2015 police report.
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angry, and I have evidence that he does other things to the contrary. Now, he was not convicted
of those things, but I ought to be allowed to inquire on that." (Tr., p.585, Ls.14-18.)
Defense counsel countered that "Mr. Reyes's position that he locks the doors when he
argues, that doesn't open the door to anything" (Tr., p.584, Ls.8-10), the evidence the State
sought to admit fell under Idaho Rule of Evidence 404(b) (Tr., p.587, Ls.14-24), and that the
probative value of that evidence did not outweigh its prejudice (Tr., p.587, L.24-p.588, L.10).
The court explained that Mr. Reyes "did make statements about his procedure is to go
into his bedroom and lock the door. If you have facts that there's been other occasions when
he's not done that, you can cross-examine with regard to those. However, I don't want-you
don't need to necessarily tie them to the intimidation of the witness charge . . . [o]r any other
criminal charges . . . . " (Tr., p.587, Ls.2-12; see also Tr., p.589, Ls.3-10.) In response to
defense counsel's Rule 404(b) argument, it said "this is evidence of impeachment that has arisen
since the defendant testified," and thus Rule 404(b) did not apply.

(Tr., p.587, Ls.18-20.)

Finally, it explained,
I have balanced the issue of prior instances. The defendant brought that up
himself in his testimony . . . . That's made instances of where they have been
involved in conflict and he hasn't gone into the bedroom and locked the door
highly relevant. And . . . although cross-examination into those areas is
prejudicial, . . . the prejudice does not substantially outweigh the relevance. And
so I'm going to allow questioning about instances known by the State in which he
has not walked into the bedroom and locked the door to get away from conflict.
(Tr., p.589, Ls.21-p.590, L.11.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Topmiller asked Mr. Reyes the following:

Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: Okay. You testified that it was your habit or
we'll call it a practice, your practice to go in your room and lock the door when
you and [Ms. Reyes] were arguing?
A. On that occasion I locked the door.
Q. But you testified that that's what you typically do?
A. Yes, I did say that.
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Q. Do you know what this is, Mr. Reyes?
A. No.
Q. This is a report from the Caldwell Police Department dated November
8th of 2015. It alleges you committed the criminal offense of attempted
strangulation, domestic battery, malicious injury to property, and witness
intimidation.
MR. PRIOR. Judge, I’m going to object.
THE COURT. Overruled.
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: You remember this incident, do you not,
Mr. Reyes?
A. Yes.
Q. And you remember that the victim in this particular case three years
ago was [Ms. Reyes] Reyes; correct?
A. Yes.
...
Q. Who is Ana Preciado?
A. My sister-in-law.
Q. So [Ms. Reyes]’s sister?
A. Correct.
Q. Who is Gilbert Laura?
A. It’s her boyfriend, partner.
Q. I’d like to approach the witness.
THE COURT: Yes, sir.
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: I’m going to have you read a paragraph. And
I’m not exactly sure how I’m going to do this.
MR. PRIOR: Well, Judge, you know—
THE COURT: I would want him to read it silently to himself first.
....
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I want the witness advised that he is not to read any
statements made by other people and that that’s hearsay.
THE COURT: They haven’t been offered yet. I just want him to read the
paragraph there.
....
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: Okay. Read this paragraph for me, would
you.
....
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: Thank you. You’ve now read that; right?
A. Correct.
Q. You remember this incident; right?
A. Yes.
Q. You remember that you and [Ms. Reyes] were fighting on that night?
A. No.
Q. You remember kicking in the door to get in the house?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember [Ms. Reyes] locking you out of the house?
A. No.
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Q. You certainly didn’t lock yourself in a room, did you?
A. I don’t understand the question.
Q. Okay. Do you remember what Ana Preciado told the police?
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I’m going to object. There’s no—
THE COURT: There’s no answer to that yet.
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: Do you remember
A. No.
Q. You don’t remember? Do you remember what Gilbert told the police?
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I’m going to object. How about knowledge, that he
has knowledge?
THE WITNESS: I don’t remember.
MR. TOPMILLER: I’m sorry, object to what? I haven’t asked a question
that calls for hearsay.
MR. PRIOR: But he does have to lay the foundation that he would even
have knowledge of what Gilbert told the police, and there hasn’t been any
testimony.
THE COURT: No, this is cross-examination. He can ask if he
remembered.
MR. PRIOR: Okay.
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: Do you remember?
A. If I remember what?
Q. Did you lock yourself in the room?
MR. PRIOR: Judge, asked and answered. Judge—
THE COURT: I’ll allow this one.
THE WITNESS: If you’re referring to last year, the 16th of July.
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: No, I’m not. I’m referring to this November
8th, 2015 incident.
You remember you were charged with attempted
strangulation, domestic battery, witness intimidation?
A. Yes, I remember.
Q. Okay. That’s what I’m talking about now. You did not lock yourself
in a room?
A. . . . No.
Q. In fact, you tried to break into the home after you were locked out.
A. No.
Q. In fact, you tried to break into the room after you were locked out.
A. What’s the question?
Q. That’s the question. You tried to break into the home.
....
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: In fact, you tried to break into the home;
correct?
A. No.
Q. [Ms. Reyes] locked you out; correct?
A. No.
Q. Ana saw you strangle [Ms. Reyes]; correct?
THE COURT: Will counsel approach.
(Sidebar conference reported as follows:)
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MR. TOPMILLER: Judge, he put him on. It’s his own fault.
THE COURT: Well, we’re talking about this. I’ve already let you go into
instances where he didn’t go in the bedroom and lock the home [sic]. You’ve
done that. But I’m not going to retry the entire incident about attempted
strangulation and that. I’m not going to allow that—
...
MR. PRIOR: In light of the fact that he made that statement, do I get to
cure that by asking him without repercussion—
...
. . . that the strangulation, the domestic, and the other charge was
dismissed? Do I get to bring that up?
THE COURT: You can bring that up—
....
. . . that they were dismissed.
....
(Sidebar conference concluded.)
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you’re to disregard the
last question from the prosecuting attorney. Not give it any consideration at all.
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: So, you spoke to the police that night
November 8th, 2015; correct?
A. Yes.
Q. And you told the police that [Ms. Reyes] attacked you?
A. If that’s what it says there.
Q. No. I’m asking you. That’s what you told the police; correct?
A. I honestly don’t remember.
Q. And in fact, [Ms. Reyes] attacked you—
MR. PRIOR: Judge, we’re getting testimony.
THE COURT: He’s answered that, Mr. Topmiller. Can we move on.
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: Okay. And you told the police you only tried
to push [Ms. Reyes] off you while she was attacking you; correct?
THE COURT. Mr. Topmiller, I don’t want to go into the specifics of that
case. I’m not going to allow that question.
MR. TOPMILLER: Okay.
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: Is it fair to say, Mr. Reyes, that what
happened in 2015 and what happened in July of 2017 are very similar?
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I’m going to object.
THE COURT: Sustained. The jury is to disregard that question.
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: And in fact, you have the same story today
that you had then?
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I’m going to object.
THE COURT: Sustained. Mr. Topmiller, we’re not going into the facts
of that. The jury is to disregard that question.
(Tr., p.595, L.18–p.604, L.22 (emphasis added).)
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On redirect-examination, Mr. Reyes testified that the pnor charges discussed by
Mr. Topmiller had been dismissed.

(Tr., p.607, Ls.9-18.)

On recross-examination,

Mr. Topmiller asked,
Q. Was [Ms. Reyes] cooperative with the prosecutor's officeMR. PRIOR: Judge, I'm going to object. That's outside the scope.
THE COURT: Sustained. Sustained.
MR. TOPMILLER: Well, there's a reason the charge was dropped.
MR. PRIOR: Judge.
THE COURT: That's my decision, Mr. Topmiller. Sustained.
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I want that question stricken.
THE COURT: Okay. The juryMR. TOPMILLER: No. Can we approach?
THE COURT: The Court's going to strike that question. The jury's not
to consider it.
(Tr., p.608, Ls.10-25 (emphasis added).)

B.

The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To "Impeach" Mr. Reyes With Evidence
Oflnstances In Which He Did Not Follow His "Usual" Practice Of Locking Himself In
His Room During An Argument With His Wife, Including Evidence Of The 2015 Police
Report Charging Mr. Reyes With Attempted Strangulation, Domestic Battery, And
Malicious Injury To Property Against Ms. Reyes
Only relevant evidence, or evidence tending to make a fact of consequence to the action

more or less likely, is admissible. I.R.E. 401, 402. Similarly, evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts is not admissible to show a defendant's criminal propensity. I.R.E. 404(b ). "It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident."
Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667 (2010); I.R.E. 404(b).

State v.

"[E]vidence of a person's actions and

conduct, other than that set forth as an ultimate issue for trial, is generally inadmissible under
I.R.E. 404(b)."

State v. Medrano, 123 Idaho 114, 119 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting State v.

Rodriguez, 118 Idaho 948, 950 (Ct. App. 1990)).
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This Court generally reviews the district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse
of discretion, State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 590 (2013), but it reviews whether evidence is
relevant de nova, State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907 (2015). A district court acts within its
discretion if it: "(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer
boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason."
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863 (2018).

To begin, the court erred when it initially ruled that "instances of where [the Reyeses]
have been involved in conflict and he hasn't gone into the bedroom and locked the door [was]
highly relevant" to impeach Mr. Reyes's testimony. (See Tr., p.589, L.24-p.590, L.2; see also
Tr., p.584, L.23-p.595, L.12.) Mr. Reyes's testimony that, when he argues with his wife, he
"usually close[s] the door," did not open the door to the State's evidence of instances in which he

did not lock himself in his bedroom while he and his wife were arguing. (Tr., p.578, Ls.18-20.)
While perhaps a claim that he always locked himself in his room would allow the State to
impeach Mr. Reyes with instances in which he did not do so, simply saying he usually locks
himself in his room acknowledges that he doesn't always do so, and thus doesn't give the State
the liberty to impeach him with evidence of that which he already acknowledged. See State v.
Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 502-03 (1999) ("Once Hairston testified that he had not fired the gun

prior to January 6th, that he had never seen anyone shot before, and that he had never pointed a
gun at anyone, the Colorado evidence became relevant to impeach his credibility.") Further, to
the extent that the court's ruling allowed the State to discuss prior charges in particular
(Tr., p.587, Ls.2-13 ("However, I don't want-you don't need to necessarily tie them to the
intimidation of the witness charge ... [o]r any other criminal charges .... ")), evidence of those
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prior charges would not have been relevant to impeach Mr. Reyes even if he had testified that he
always locked the door and instead went purely to propensity-if Mr. Reyes was charged for
beating up his wife in the past, he probably did it again. See I.R.E. 401, 402, 404(b); State v.

Joy, 155 Idaho 1, 10-11 (2013) (holding that past instances in which Joy had abused his wife
were inadmissible in his trial for abusing his wife because "the only way the prior misconduct
makes the charged conduct more likely to have occurred is by propensity.... '[I]fhe did it once,
he probably did it again.'")
More problematically, once the cross-examination began, Mr. Topmiller went far beyond
simply asking Mr. Reyes about any times that he argued with his wife but did not lock himself in
his room in an effort to impeach Mr. Reyes. Instead, Mr. Topmiller started his cross examination
with guns blazing: "Q. Do you know what this is, Mr. Reyes? A. No. Q. This is a report from

the Caldwell Police Department dated November 8th of 2015. It alleges you committed the
criminal offense of attempted strangulation, domestic battery, malicious injury to property, and
witness intimidation." (Tr., p.596, Ls.13-19 (emphasis added).) The district court erred and
abused its discretion by allowing that "question" and subsequent use of the police report to
question Mr. Reyes. 4
First, Mr. Topmiller did not actually ask a question, but instead was himself testifying
when he told the jury about the contents of the police report. State v. Gerardo, 147 Idaho 22, 26
& n.4 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that a prosecutor who places facts not in evidence before the jury

4

Although Mr. Reyes acknowledges that defense counsel did not specify the basis for his
objection to that "question," under no circumstances was that "question" proper and the bases for
that objection are apparent from the context. See Tr., p.583, L.20-p.590, L.11, Almaraz, 154
Idaho 601-02 (explaining that, "[ t]or an objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the
specific ground for the objection must be clearly stated, or the basis of the objection must be
apparent from the context," and concluding that the issue there was preserved "within the context
of the arguments contained in the transcripts").
15

violates I.R.E. 603 (requiring that witnesses be sworn) and the predecessor to I.R.E. 103(d)
(“proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent inadmissible
evidence from being suggested to the jury”), and also commits misconduct). Second, because
Mr. Topmiller testified to the contents of a police report, his testimony was double or triple
hearsay not subject to any exception. See I.R.E. 801(c) (“‘Hearsay’ is a statement, other than
one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.”); I.R.E. 802 (hearsay is generally not admissible); see also
Tr., p.597, L.25–p.298, L.2 (defense counsel stating, “I want the witness advised that he is not to
read any statements made by other people and that that’s hearsay.”) (emphasis added). Third,
Mr. Topmiller’s testimony was not proper impeachment because “[s]pecific instances of the
conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the credibility, of the witness,
may not be proved by extrinsic evidence,” but may be adduced by cross-examination. I.R.E.
608(b); see, e.g., State v. Carson, 151 Idaho 713, 717 (2011) (holding that witnesses could not
testify to impeach another witness’s credibility because that testimony was extrinsic evidence
prohibited by Rule 608); State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 710 n.2 (Ct. App. 2013) (“‘Extrinsic
evidence’ in this context means ‘[e]vidence that is calculated to impeach a witness’s credibility,
adduced by means other than cross-examination of the witness.’ It ‘may include evidence in
documents and recordings and the testimony of other witnesses.’”) (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 597 (8th ed. 2004)). Fourth, Mr. Topmiller’s testimony—which informed the jury
that Mr. Reyes had been charged with three of the same offenses he faced that day—was nothing
but irrelevant propensity evidence. See Tr., p.587, Ls.14–24; I.R.E. 401, 402, 404(b); Joy,
155 Idaho at 10–11.
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Therefore, the district court erred by concluding that evidence of instances in which
Mr. Reyes did not follow his "usual" custom of locking himself in his room during an argument
was relevant, and further abused its discretion by allowing the prosecutor's testimony and
"questions" about the 2015 police report charging Mr. Reyes with attempted strangulation,
domestic battery, and malicious injury to property against Ms. Reyes.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Concluding That This Evidence Was More
Probative Than Prejudicial
The court may exclude even relevant evidence "if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury."
I.R.E. 403. "Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision on an improper basis."

State v. Fordyce, 151 Idaho 868, 870 (Ct. App. 2011). This Court reviews whether the probative
value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect for an abuse of discretion.

Ehrlick,

158 Idaho at 907; Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863.
The district court abused its discretion by concluding that the challenged evidence was
more prejudicial than probative because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards and did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason. See Tr., p.589, Ls.21-p.590,
L.11; LR.E. 403; Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863. This evidence purported to impeach Mr. Reyes
by showing that Mr. Reyes did not testify truthfully when he said he usually locks himself in his
room when arguing with his wife, did not go directly to the elements of the crimes with which
Mr. Reyes was charged, and thus has very little probative value.

See R., pp.193-199 Gury

instructions); LC. §§ 18-903(a), 18-918(2) (domestic battery with traumatic injury); LC. § 18923 (attempted strangulation); LC. §§ 18-901(a)-(b), 18-905(a); (aggravated assault). The risk of
unfair prejudice, on the other hand, was high. Especially in the absence of a limiting instruction,
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a prior instance in which Mr. Reyes allegedly committed the same violent acts against his wife as
those alleged in this trial, and in particular that he was charged with the same crimes in the past,
suggested that the jury draw the impermissible inference that if Mr. Reyes did it once, he
probably did it again. See Joy, 155 Idaho at 10-11. The district court abused its discretion by
concluding that the probative value of this evidence outweighed its unfair prejudice.

D.

The State Cannot Show That The Erroneous Admission Of This Evidence Is Harmless
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
When a defendant objects to an error and shows that a violation occurred, the State bears

the burden of proving, '"beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained."'

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 221 (2008) (quoting

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). The question "is whether the jury actually
rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt,
independently of' the inadmissible evidence. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 404 (1991). "The
inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict
would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial
was surely unattributable to the error."

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993)

(emphasis added).
It goes without saying that this evidence contributed to the verdicts in this case. See id.
The jury heard that Mr. Reyes was charged with three of the same crimes against this same
victim two years before.

(Tr., p.596, L.13-p.597, L.3, p.600, L.21-p.601, L.1.)

Although

Mr. Reyes answered "no" to many of the questions about the 2015 charges, Mr. Topmiller's
reference to the police report and accusations made by Ms. Reyes's family members gave
credence to his questions about whether Mr. Reyes's sister-in-law told the police that Mr. Reyes
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had strangled Ms. Reyes, whether Ms. Reyes locked Mr. Reyes out of the house, and whether
Mr. Reyes kicked in the door. (See Tr., p.597, L.9–p.602, L.1.)
By the same token, although the district court sustained many of defense counsel’s
objections as Mr. Topmiller’s “questioning” devolved into repeated instances of misconduct, he
nevertheless achieved the intended goal of putting irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial information to
the jury.

See State v. Marmentini, 152 Idaho 269, 271 (Ct. App. 2011) (“prosecutorial

misconduct may so infect the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of
due process even when objections are sustained.”); Tr., p.604, Ls.4–22 (“Q.

BY

MR. TOPMILLER: Okay. And you told the police you only tried to push [Ms. Reyes] off you
while she was attacking you; correct? . . . . Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: Is it fair to say,
Mr. Reyes, that what happened in 2015 and what happened in July of 2017 are very similar? . . . .
Q. BY MR. TOPMILLER: And in fact, you have the same story today that you had then?”),
p.608, Ls.10–16 (“Q. [BY MR. TOPMILLER:]

Was [Ms. Reyes] cooperative with the

prosecutor’s office— MR. PRIOR: Judge, I’m going to object. That’s outside the scope. THE
COURT: Sustained. Sustained. MR. TOPMILLER: Well, there’s a reason the charge was
dropped.”) (emphasis added).)

That the court later instructed the jury that arguments and

statements by lawyers are not evidence and that it should disregard testimony that has been
excluded or stricken surely did little to remedy this pervasive error. (See Tr., p.638, Ls.6–18;
R., p.189.)
Finally, despite having purportedly admitted this evidence as impeachment, the district
court never gave the jury a limiting instruction. (See generally Tr., p.594, L.16–p.609, L.17;
R., pp.117–209) Therefore, the jury was left to draw the impermissible inference—invited by
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the prosecutor-that Mr. Reyes had done it once, so he must have done it again. See Tr., p.604,
Ls.4-22; Joy, 155 Idaho at 10-11.
This line of questioning about pure propensity evidence-beginning with purported
"impeachment" and ending with Mr. Topmiller's blatant attempts to secure a conviction by
unethical and impermissible means-undoubtedly contributed to the verdicts in this case.
Because the State will not be able to meet its burden of proving the error harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt, this Court should vacate Mr. Reyes' s judgment of conviction.

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Admitting Ms. Reyes's Preliminary Hearing
Testimony Because Ms. Reyes Was Available For Trial And Thus Her Preliminary Hearing
Testimony Was Inadmissible Hearsay
The district court allowed the State to read Ms. Reyes' s preliminary hearing testimony to
the jury after concluding that Ms. Reyes was unavailable because the State had been unable to
serve her with a subpoena for the correct trial dates. Because Ms. Reyes was under defense
counsel's subpoena to appear the next day and defense counsel informed the court that
Ms. Reyes intended to testify, the district court abused its discretion by admitting that hearsay
testimony. The State will be unable to prove that error harmless, and so this Court should vacate
Mr. Reyes' s judgment of conviction.

A.

Factual Background
Half way through the second day of trial, the State sought to declare Ms. Reyes

unavailable so that it could read her preliminary hearing testimony to the jury. (Tr., p.342, L.18p.343, L.4.)

Four witnesses testified to their unsuccessful attempts to serve Ms. Reyes a

subpoena for the correct trial dates of May 2-4 (Tr., p.345, L.5-p.359, L.15), though the State
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had successfully served her a subpoena for the alternative trial dates of May 16 through 18,
apparently after the court set the trial for a start date of May 2. (See Tr., p.352, L.2–p.353, L.5
(Investigator Lindauer testifying that, on April 23, he served Ms. Reyes a subpoena for the
alternate trial dates of May 16 through 18), p.357, Ls.9–13 (Investigator Thompson testifying
that, when they served Ms. Reyes a subpoena for the alternate trial dates, he was aware there
were two possible trial dates), p.360, L.21–p.361,L.1 (defense counsel arguing that, “ironically
enough, Judge, the date after they started serving her was after we were notified that we’re going
on this particular trial date. So I don’t even know why they were serving her on that date.”);
R., p.97 (April 17 court minutes reflecting that Mr. Reyes’s trial was the only one set on
May 2).)
Defense counsel objected. First, he asked the court not to consider the State’s motion
because it was untimely and he was not provided notice that would allow him to present
evidence to show that Ms. Reyes was in fact available to testify. (Tr., p.343, Ls.5–15, p.360,
Ls.3–11, p.365, Ls.10–14.) Second, he argued that the State had not diligently attempted to
serve Ms. Reyes because it served Mr. Reyes with a subpoena for the May 16 trial date, knowing
full well the trial was supposed to start on May 2. (Tr., p.360, L.17–p.361, L.14.) Third and
most importantly, he explained that he had been in contact with Ms. Reyes, she was in fact under
defense counsel’s subpoena, and she would be there to testify the very next day. (Tr., p.344,
Ls.2–21, p.361, L.15–p.362, L.12.) Therefore, she was not unavailable for trial. (Id.)
The court found Ms. Reyes unavailable, explaining:
I’ve reviewed 804(a)(5), which defines unavailability is [sic] the witness is absent
from the hearing and the proponent of the declarant’s statements have been unable
to procure declarant’s attendance by process or other reasonable means.
I have reviewed this. It is apparent that Ms. Reyes has been actively
avoiding the service of process. I understand a mistake on the trial dates because
the Court is clearly aware of what previously has happened in this case, and the
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Court said today may be available, but there is one case with priority and . . . that
case went away, but I had given a second date beginning the 15th of this month.
I furthermore don’t think that the State should be required to bear the risk
of whether or not Ms. Reyes decides to appear tomorrow. And then certainly they
could cross-examine her on her preliminary hearing testimony, which could be
used as substantive evidence by the jury if it impeaches her under the rules
because it was prior sworn testimony. But that would be requiring the State to
bear the brunt of her failure to appear. And I don’t think that the State should
have to do that should she not appear or have to take the risk should she not
appear.
For purposes of 804(a)(5), this Court does find that the declarant is
unavailable. . . . And the Court finds that the witness by actively avoiding service
of process now is unavailable pursuant to Rule 804(a)(5). Will allow the State to
present her preliminary hearing transcript.
(Tr., p.363, L.23–p.365, L.9 (emphasis added).)
The State then read Ms. Reyes’s preliminary hearing transcript to the jury. (Tr., p.370,
L.18–p.375, L.13.) In that testimony, Ms. Reyes said that Mr. Reyes hit, choked, and kicked her
on the night in question, and that she broke her arm, nose, and teeth as a result. (Tr., p.372,
Ls.6–15, p.374, L.10.) After reading Ms. Reyes’s testimony to the jury, the State continued
calling its witnesses. (Tr., p.377, L.14–p.494, L.5.) The State had to call its final witness the
next morning because she was not available until then.

(Tr., p.494, Ls.10–12; see also

Tr., p.280, L.1–p.281, L.16 (the State telling the court at the end of the day Wednesday, which
was the first day of trial, that it would need to call one witness on Friday morning).)
First thing the next morning, the district court told counsel that it had called the chief
public defender that morning to request that he appoint Ms. Reyes an attorney to discuss
potential consequences of her testimony, should she appear to testify. (Tr., p.497, Ls.6–24.) In
particular, the court wanted the public defender to have access to the preliminary hearing
transcript because it was concerned that Ms. Reyes could be charged with perjury if she were to
testify.

(Tr., p.497, L.20–p.498, L.18.)

After the State rested later that day, the attorney

appointed to represent Ms. Reyes told the court that Ms. Reyes intended to invoke her Fifth
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Amendment right against self-incrimination if called as a witness. (Tr., p.558, L.24-p.559, L.25,
p.564, Ls.6-16.)

Without explicitly finding that Ms. Reyes might actually run the risk of

incriminating herself if she were to testify, the court told the parties that they could call
Ms. Reyes and have her plead the Fifth on the stand if they wished. (Tr., p.564, Ls.17-21.)
Defense counsel opted to do so. (Tr., p.564, Ls.22-25.) He called Ms. Reyes to the stand, and
when asked whether she remembered what happened on the night in question, she invoked her
right against self-incrimination and said she would not answer any questions about the alleged
incident.

(Tr., p.570, L.14-p.572, L.15.)

The court excused Ms. Reyes from testifying.

(Tr., p.572, Ls.20-23.)

B.

Ms. Reyes Was Not Unavailable For Trial, And Thus Her Preliminary Hearing
Testimony Was Inadmissible Hearsay
"'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the

trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." I.R.E. 801(c).
Hearsay is generally inadmissible, unless an exception applies. I.R.E. 802. According to I.R.E.
804(b)(l)(A)-(B), a witness's former testimony is "not excluded by the rule against hearsay if
the declarant is unavailable as a witness," the former testimony was given "at a trial, hearing, or
lawful deposition," and it "is now offered against a party who had .. an opportunity and similar
motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination." A witness is unavailable if she
"is absent from the trial or hearing and the statement's proponent has not been able, by process
or other reasonable means, to procure ... [her] attendance." I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A). "A witness is
not 'unavailable' ... merely because she cannot be present on a particular day." State v. Perry,
144 Idaho 266, 269 (Ct. App. 2007). "The proponent of admitting the former testimony bears
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the burden of proving the declarant’s unavailability.” State v. Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho 375, 381
(2015).
This Court reviews the district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse
of discretion. Almaraz, 154 Idaho at 590; Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863. “In determining
unavailability, ‘[t]he district court’s factual finding must be supported by substantial and
competent evidence.’” Lopez-Orozco, 159 Idaho at 381 (quoting State v. Richardson, 156 Idaho
524, 531 (2014)).
The district court abused its discretion when it declared Ms. Reyes unavailable because it
did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards and did not reach its decision by an
exercise of reason. Ms. Reyes, who intended to—and in fact did—take the stand the next day,
was undoubtedly not an “unavailable” witness. (See Tr., p.344, Ls.11–19, p.361, L.15–p.362,
L.3) The district court’s stated reasons for declaring her unavailable were that she was “actively
avoiding the service of process” and it did not “think that the State should be required to bear the
risk of whether or not Ms. Reyes decid[ed] to appear” the next day. (Tr., p.363, L.23–p.365, L.9
(emphasis added).) By definition, the mere risk that a witness not appear to testify is not grounds
to declare them unavailable. See I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A) (A witness is unavailable if she “is absent
from the trial or hearing and the statement’s proponent has not been able, by process or other
reasonable means, to procure . . . [her] attendance.”). Further, Ms. Reyes intended to testify the
next day (see Tr., p.344, Ls.11–19, p.361, L.15–p.362, L.3), she was under defense counsel’s
subpoena (see Tr., p.344, L.21), and her failure to testify would amount to contempt, see
I.C.R. 17(f); I.C. § 19-3010. A subpoena merely compels a witness’s attendance at trial, and is
not a prerequisite to being able to call the witness. See I.C.R. 17(a) (“A subpoena must be issued
by the clerk of the court or the judge, and must command each person to whom it is directed to
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attend and give testimony at the time and place specified in it.") (emphasis added); SUBPOENA,

Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) ("subpoena (s~-pee-n~) n. [Latin "under penalty"] (15c)
A writ or order commanding a person to appear before a court or other tribunal .... ") (emphasis
added); see generally I.C.R. 16(b)(6) (requiring the State to disclose a witness list on written
request); I.C.R. 16(±)(2) (failure to comply can be sanctioned); I.R.E. 601-603 (qualifications for
a witness to testify). There was therefore nothing stopping the State from calling Ms. Reyes in
its case-in-chief when she showed up at court the next day. See Perry, 144 Idaho at 269.
In short, Ms. Reyes was not unavailable per I.R.E. 804(a)(5)(A) simply because the State
had been unable to serve her a subpoena requiring her to attend trial on its preferred day. The
district court abused its discretion by concluding otherwise and by admitting Ms. Reyes's
hearsay preliminary hearing testimony at trial.

C.

The District Court's Erroneous Decision to Declare Ms. Reyes Unavailable And Admit
Her Preliminary Hearing Testimony Surely Contributed To The Verdict
The district court's erroneous decision to declare Ms. Reyes unavailable and admit her

preliminary hearing testimony surely contributed to the verdict, and so the State will not be able
to meet its burden of proving otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at
279; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Perry, 150 Idaho at 221. In that testimony, Ms. Reyes said that
Mr. Reyes hit, choked, and kicked her on the night in question, and that she broke her arm, nose,
and teeth as a result. (Tr., p.372, Ls.6-15, p.374, L.10.) After reading that testimony to the jury,
the district court compounded the error by allowing Ms. Reyes to invoke the Fifth Amendment
rather than testify. (Tr., p.564, Ls.17-21.) The only way Ms. Reyes could have validly invoked
the Fifth Amendment is if she had already perjured herself by testifying falsely at the
preliminary hearing, as her truthful testimony at trial would bear out. See U.S. CONST. amend. V
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("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself .... ").
In that case, the district court never should have allowed her perjured testimony to be read to the
jury. On the other hand, if Ms. Reyes was about to perjure herself by testifying falsely, then she
should have been required to testify because the Fifth Amendment shields an individual only
from being a witness against themselves, and not from committing a crime. See U.S. CONST.
amend. V; I.R.E. 804(a)(l) (a witness is unavailable, thus allowing her former testimony to be
admitted, if she is "exempted from testifying about the subject matter of the declarant's
statement because the court rules that a privilege applies"); S. Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553,
563 (1983) (discussing the "cruel trilemma" of the extreme view that being compelled to testify
does not violate the Fifth Amendment because the witness can decide whether to "submit to self
accusation, or testify falsely (risking perjury) or decline to testify (risking contempt)").
Therefore, the error surely contributed to the verdict, and the State will be unable to prove
otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt.

This Court should vacate Mr. Reyes's judgment of

conviction.

III.
The District Court Erred By Allowing The State To Introduce Irrelevant Evidence That
Mr. Reyes Was On Probation At The Time Of These Alleged Crimes And Thus Should Not
Have Been In A Bar Or Drinking Alcohol
Over defense counsel's relevance objection, the court allowed the prosecutor to ask
Mr. Reyes about being on probation and whether that meant he should not have been in a bar or
drinking alcohol. That evidence was not relevant to any fact of consequence in this case, and so
the district court erred by admitting it. Because the State will be unable to show, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict, this Court should vacate
Mr. Reyes' s judgment of conviction.
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A.

Factual background
After Mr. Reyes's direct-examination, Mr. Topmiller asked the district court to allow the

State to discuss the fact that Mr. Reyes was on felony probation and thus should not have been in
a bar or drinking alcohol on the night in question. (Tr., p.583, L.25-p.584, L.3.) Mr. Topmiller
did not attempt to explain how that evidence was relevant to the charges against Mr. Reyes, but
simply said that Mr. Reyes knew he wasn't supposed to be in a bar or drinking. (See id.; see also
Tr., p.585, L.24-p.586, L.4.)

Defense counsel objected, explaining "that's what probation

violations are for. And there's one pending." (Tr., p.584, Ls.4-5.) Likely due to the number of
issues the parties had discussed, the court did not explicitly rule on that request at that time.
(Tr., p.583, L.3-p.593, L.8.) Then on cross-examination, the prosecutor asked the following:
Q. On July 16 of2017 you were on felony probation, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So you were not supposed to be in a bar, were you?
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I'm going to object to relevance.
THE COURT. Overruled.
THE WITNESS: Correct.
Q. MY MR. TOPMILLER: And you were not supposed to be drinking either,
were you?
A. Correct.

(Tr., p.595, Ls.6-17.)

B.

Evidence That Mr. Reyes Was On Probation And So He Should Not Have Been In A Bar
Or Drinking Alco ho 1 Was Not Relevant To Any Fact Of Consequence In This Case
Only relevant evidence, or evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence," is admissible. I.R.E. 401, 402. This Court reviews whether
evidence is relevant de novo. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 907.
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Simply put, Mr. Reyes's status as a probationer had no bearing on whether he committed
domestic battery, attempted strangulation, or aggravated assault on Ms. Reyes, and thus was not
relevant. See I.R.E. 401,402; R., pp.193-199; LC.§§ 18-901(a)-(b), 18-903(a), 18-905(a), 18918(2), 18-923. Instead, that evidence only went to show that Mr. Reyes was a man of bad
character-not only was he on felony probation, which in itself carries stigma, but as a result he
should not have gone to a bar or been drinking on the night in question.

C.

The State Cannot Show That The Erroneous Admission Of This Evidence Is Harmless
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
The State will be unable to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that evidence that

Mr. Reyes was on probation did not contribute to the verdicts in this case. See Sullivan, 508 U.S.
at 279; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Perry, 150 Idaho at 221.

This Court should vacate his

judgment of conviction.

IV.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Ms. Neri's Irrelevant Testimony About How She Asked
Officers Not To Tell Mr. Reyes She Had Called 911
Over defense counsel's relevance objection, the district court allowed Ms. Neri to testify
that she had asked the po lice to tell Mr. Reyes that the neighbors had called the po lice, rather
than Ms. Neri, because then Ms. Reyes wouldn't talk to her. That testimony was not relevant to
any fact of consequence in this case, and so the district court erred by admitting it. Because the
State will be unable to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the
verdict, this Court should vacate Mr. Reyes' s judgment of conviction.
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A.

Factual Background
During Ms. Neri's testimony, the prosecutor asked the following:
Q [by the prosecutor]. And I hate to ask you this question, [Ms. Neri], but
are you scared to be testifying here today?
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I'm going to object.
THE COURT: Sustained.
Q. By MS. MORRISON: [Ms. Neri], when you spoke with law
enforcement on July 16 of 2017, did you ask them to tell the defendant that the
neighbors had called the po lice?
A. Yes.
Q. Why did you ask them to tell him that the neighbors called the police?
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I'm going to object. It's irrelevant.
MS. MORRISON: Your Honor, I think it goes to motive or bias, which I
assume defense is going to attack.
MR. PRIOR: Then it goes to speculation then if she doesn't know I'm
going to attack it or not.
THE COURT: Overruled. I will allow it.
Q. Why did you ask the police to tell the defendant that the neighbors had
called instead of you?
A. Because then my aunt won't talk to me anymore.
Q. Is [Ms. Reyes] talking to you at this point in time?
A. No.
Q. Is she talking to most of your family members at this point in time?
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I'm going to object. Knowledge. How about
foundation that she even knows whether that's happening or not.
THE COURT: She can answer if she knows.
THE WITNESS: No.
Q. By MS. MORRISON: So she's not having contact with most of your
family at this point in time?
A. No.

(Tr., p.226, L.13-p.228 L.5.)

B.

Ms. Neri's Request That Officers Not Tell Mr. Reyes She Had Called 911 Was Not
Relevant To Any Fact Of Consequence In This Case
Only relevant evidence, or evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any

fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence," is admissible. I.R.E. 401, 402. Evidence is only relevant to
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rehabilitate a witness after the witness's credibility has been attacked. See State v. Ellington,
151 Idaho 53, 62 (2011 ). This Court reviews whether evidence is relevant de novo. Ehrlick,
158 Idaho at 907.
Ms. Neri's testimony-that she asked the officers to tell Mr. Reyes that a neighbor called
the police because then her aunt would not talk to her-had no tendency to make the existence of
any fact of consequence to the determination of whether Mr. Reyes committed domestic battery,
attempted strangulation, or aggravated assault on Ms. Reyes more or less probable. See I.R.E.
401, 402; LC. §§ 18-901(a)-(b), 18-903(a), 18-905(a), 18-918(2), 18-923. Nor was it properly
admitted to rebut a supposed anticipated attack on Ms. Neri's credibility as argued by the State.
See Ellington, 151 Idaho at 62 ("While the prosecution here claims that the question was relevant

to rebut anticipated impeachment or attacks on Mr. Hartmann's character by the defense by
attempting to establish that Mr. Hartmann was not fired for poor performance, a witness's
credibility and character may not be supported before it has been attacked.") (citing I.R.E.

608(a)-(b)); Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 532-34 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding that the district
court improperly admitted testimony supporting the witness's character for truthfulness on redirect examination because the opposing party did not attack on the witness's credibility or
character during cross-examination)). The district court thus erred by admitting that irrelevant
testimony.

C.

The State Cannot Show That The Erroneous Admission Of Ms. Neri's Testimony Is
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
Ms. Neri's testimony was not just impermissible bolstering. More importantly, it was the

State's backdoor attempt to tell the jury that Mr. Reyes is feared. Ms. Morrison began this line
of questioning by saying "I hate to ask you this question, [Ms. Neri], but are you scared to be
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testifying here today?" before asking "Why did you ask them to tell him that the neighbors called
the police?" (Tr., p.226, Ls.13-24.) As a result, the State will be unable to meet its burden of
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Ms. Neri's testimony did not contribute to the verdict.

See Perry, 150 Idaho at 221; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279. This Court
should vacate Mr. Reyes 's judgment of conviction.

V.
The District Court Erred By Allowing The Prosecutor To Imply In Closing That Ms. Reyes Did
Not Testify Because She Was Scared Of Mr. Reyes And Thus Was Reluctant To Testify
Over defense counsel's objection, the court allowed the prosecutor to tell the jury in
closing that Ms. Reyes had not testified that day because she was scared of Mr. Reyes and thus
was reluctant to testify. The prosecutor's claim misrepresented the facts and put facts not in
evidence before the jury, and thus amounted to misconduct. Because the State will be unable to
show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error did not contribute to the verdict, this Court
should vacate Mr. Reyes 's judgment of conviction.

A.

Factual Background
During its closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury:
In a perfect world, [Ms. Reyes] would have told you again what happened.
But you know what happened....
You heard testimony from Corporal Sheri Cameron that victims of
domestic violence recant. When we were talking in voir dire, most of you knew
someone who had been a victim of domestic violence. Some of you had watched
the Ray Rice video and has watched Janay Rice recant. Some of you were
horrified by the fact that might happen.
Corporal Sheri Cameron told you that police departments like the Boise
Police Department have to have special detectives to deal with cases like this.
Why? Because victims recant. Because they're reluctant to come in and tell
what's happened.
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[Ms. Reyes] was brave enough to tell her story to emergency room
doctors, to a dentist, under oath. The fact that you didn't hear it from her again
today shouldn't prevent you from doing what needs to be done. You have all of
the evidence to convict the defendant in this case of all of these charges.
Certainly [Ms. Reyes] is probably scared.
MR. PRIOR: Judge, I'm going to object at this point.
THE COURT: It's argument.
MR. PRIOR: All right.
MS. MORRISON: Why would she want to come in and say what happened
again? Tell a room full of strangers that the person who vowed to love, honor,
and cherish her did this to her . . . .
(Tr., p.652, L.1-p.653, L.13.)

B.

The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Implying That Ms. Reyes Did Not Testify
Because She Was Scared Of Mr. Reyes And Thus Was Reluctant To Testify
"While our system of criminal justice is adversary in nature and the prosecutor is

expected to be diligent and leave no stone unturned, he is nevertheless expected and required to
be fair and has a duty to avoid misrepresentation of the facts .... " State v. Grifjiths, 101 Idaho
163, 166 (1980). "[I]t is decidedly improper for the government to propound inferences that it
knows to be false," United States v. Blueford, 312 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2002); see also
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (a prosecutor's "improper suggestions [and]
insinuations . . . are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly
carry none"), or to put facts not in evidence before the jury, United States v. Udechukwu, 11 F.3d
1101, 1106 (1st Cir. 1993).
When reviewing a preserved claim of misconduct, this Court "first determine[ s] whether
the prosecutorial conduct complained of was improper," then considers whether the error was
harmless beyond reasonable doubt. Marmentini, 152 Idaho at 272. 5

5

Mr. Reyes is unaware of a case from the Idaho appellate courts setting forth a true standard of
review for determining whether a statement amounts to misconduct, but he believes that de novo
review is appropriate.
32

By implying to the jury that Ms. Reyes did not testify because she was scared of
Mr. Reyes and thus was reluctant to tell what happened, the prosecutor invited the jury to infer
facts which she knew to be false and put facts not in evidence before the jury, thus committing
misconduct. See Tr., p.652, L.1-p.653, L.13; Blueford, 312 F.3d at 968-69 (finding misconduct
because the "prosecutor was asking the jury to infer one or more facts that he either knew to be
false or, at least, could not have believed might be true, given that he had specific evidence
indicating the contrary"); Udechukwu, 11 F .3d at 1106 ("[I]t is plainly improper for a prosecutor
to imply reliance on knowledge or evidence not available to the jury. It is all the more improper
to imply reliance on a fact that the prosecutor knows to be untrue .... ") (quotation marks
omitted). Ms. Reyes intended to testify for the defense, apparently consistently with an earlier
statement she made to law enforcement that she had no recollection of the alleged altercation, but
inconsistently with her preliminary hearing testimony.

(Tr., p.567, Ls.3-9 (defense counsel

making an offer of proof regarding Ms. Reyes's testimony), p.493, Ls.3-23 (testimony about
Ms. Reyes's earlier statement to law enforcement).) The only reason she did not testify is
because the district court, apparently under the belief that Ms. Reyes had testified truthfully at
the preliminary hearing and would perjure herself by testifying in Mr. Reyes's defense, sua
sponte appointed Ms. Reyes a lawyer to warn her not to perjure herself, and Ms. Reyes, afraid
that the State would charge her with perjury if she testified on behalf of Mr. Reyes, took that
advice. (Tr., p.497, L.6-p.498, L.18, p.558, L.24--p.559, L.25, p.564, Ls.6-16, p.586, Ls.8-14
(Mr. Topmiller explaining, outside the presence of the jury, that "[w ]e have a witness who got on
the stand and invoked the Fifth. . . . The Court saw fit, was so concerned enough [sic] to appoint
her a lawyer, right, because it believed she was going to lie about that incident that had occurred.
So clearly this defendant's prior behavior and conviction are both relevant evidence that the jury
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ought to consider."), p.570, L.14-p.572, L.15.) Although, as discussed above, Ms. Reyes could
not legitimately invoke the Fifth Amendment to avoid perjuring herself, that is what the district
court allowed (indeed, proactively encouraged) her to do. (See Issue II(C).) Thus, contrary to
the prosecutor's claims, Ms. Reyes in fact declined to testify because she was afraid of being
charged with perjury for testifying in Mr. Reyes' s defense, and because she was erroneously
allowed to plead the Fifth Amendment. She did not decline to testify because she was "probably
scared" (at least not of Mr. Reyes, as the State implied), because she had recanted, or because
she was reluctant to tell what happened. (Tr., p.652, L.1-p.653, L. 13.) The prosecutor invited
the jury to infer facts she knew to be false and put facts not in evidence before the jury, thus
committing misconduct.

C.

The State Will Be Unable To Prove That The Prosecutor's Misconduct Did Not
Contribute To The Verdicts
The prosecutor's claims-which conveyed to the jury that Ms. Reyes intended to testify

consistently with her preliminary hearing testimony but declined to do so because she was afraid
of Mr. Reyes-impermissibly buttressed its narrative that Ms. Reyes was a victim of domestic
abuse at the hands of Mr. Reyes. That misconduct contributed to the verdicts, and the State will
not be able to meet its burden of proving otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sullivan,
508 U.S. at 279; Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24; Perry, 150 Idaho at 221.

VI.
This Court Should Vacate Mr. Reyes' s Judgment Of Conviction Because, Even If These Errors
Are Individually Harmless, Together They Deprived Mr. Reyes Of His Fourteenth Amendment
Right To Due Process And A Fair Trial
Errors which individually might be harmless can require reversal if the accumulation of
those errors show the defendant was denied a fair trial and thus due process. State v. Paciorek,
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137 Idaho 629, 635 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445, 453 (1994). In order to
find cumulative error, this Court must first conclude that there is merit to more than one of the
alleged errors, and then conclude that the aggregate of those errors denied the defendant a fair
trial. State v. Lovelass, 133 Idaho 160, 171 (Ct. App. 1999).
The district court's errors in this case, even if individually harmless, together deprived
him of a fair trial. The errors are stitched together by a common thread-they paint Mr. Reyes as
a bad person, a wife-batterer, a repeat offender, and someone who is feared by those who know
him. Given the pervasiveness of these themes throughout the trial, and their pernicious tendency
to sway the jury's deliberations, the above errors together deprived Mr. Reyes of due process and
a fair trial.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Reyes respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction and
remand this case to the district court for further proceedings.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2019.

/s/ Maya P. Waldron
MAYAP. WALDRON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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